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The Capitalist Manifesto. By Louis 0. Kelso and Mortimer J. Adler. New
York: Random House, 1958. Pp. xviii, 265. $3.75.
Mortimer Adler, former Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the
University of Chicago, and student of the "great ideas," has joined with a San
Francisco corporation lawyer, Louis 0. Kelso, in authorship of a small but
ambitious volume titled intriguingly-if somewhat deceptively-The Capitalist
Manifesto. Though uneven, it is an interesting and provocative contribution to
"utopian" economic thought. In some ways it recalls the work of another
Chicagoan, economist Henry C. Simons,1 who taught at the University of Chicago Law School until his death. Relating the authors' first venture into economics to Professor Simons' work is unfortunate in one sense. After all, Adler
is an analyst of philosophic thought and Kelso a man of practical affairs. In
economics, their technical proficiency and sophistication are inevitably far less
than that of Simons. But the comparison also has its positive side. This is that,
even though the authors start from so different an orientation, they yet arrive
at an economic viewpoint and make policy recommendations tending in the
same direction as those of Simons. This is certainly to their credit.
The basic observation upon which the book builds is not new, and has often
been made under questionable auspices. It is that the traditional attributes of
private ownership of property are becoming so greatly circumscribed that that
institution may soon be impotent to perform its historical role as a source, or
at least a guardian, of political freedom. From there, after a typological and
historical survey of economic systems, the authors go on to analyze how and
why the institution of private property is so radically changing, and to suggest
constructive, rather than reactionary, steps which might be taken to rehabilitate
it. Interestingly, their proposals for rehabilitation deal almost entirely with the
corporate form of property ownership. Unlike earlier reformers who were preoccupied with land or the small shopkeeper, craftsman or business man, Kelso
and Adler are concerned with policy regarding corporations and the securities
portfolio.
The authors feel that the tendency toward the socialization of property has
been caused by a historical concentration of ownership of capital in the hands
of a few. Prior to the first World War, production was "laboristic"-labor contributed more to the national product than did capital. Yet the distribution of
the product, in that it went largely to the property-owning class, was "capitalistic." Of course the authors do not trace in detail the evolution and gradual
breakdown of what they call "primitive capitalism." Their concern is that its
injustices were redressed not by positive measures to encourage the deconcentration of capital by broadening its ownership base, but largely by government
intervention which diverted to labor (as wages) and to the general public (as
I The major writings of Professor Simons, except for his major work on taxation, are collected in Economic Policy for a Free Society (1948). See particularly chapter two, "A Positive
Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic Policy."
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transfer payments) a large part of the product properly attributable to capital's
productiveness. The diversion is manifested in high progressive income taxation, large governmental redistributive expenditures, and state encouragement
of labor monopoly.
These measures undoubtedly alleviated the pressures which might otherwise,
as Marx predicted, have destroyed enterprise capitalism completely. But the
"mixed capitalism" which they characterize is not a sound or stable type of
economic system. Among its defects are that it is inherently seriously inflationary. Another is that, as the economy becomes increasingly capitalistic, the
greater transfer problems involved in distributing its output to non-capitalistic
householders cause a tendency toward total state socialism. And this, hold the
authors, is incompatible with individual responsibility and political freedom.
The problem is far advanced in most Western nations. In the United States
capital accumulation has been so effective that today, according to the authors,
its productivity accounts for 90 per cent of the national product. Yet the state
has become so vigorous in its redistributive activities that the owners of capital
receive only 30 per cent of that product. This "laboristic" distribution of the
national product is as unjust as was the primitive capitalism of the 19th century and is a crushingly effective inhibitor of economic progress.
What is needed, the authors believe, is a radical but bloodless "capitalist
revolution." The revolution must achieve a system characterized by two basic
features: first, capital must be fairly evenly distributed among all households;
second, capital must receive as its distributive share the full product attributable to it. As a result of the development of the modern corporation and its
separation of the ownership and management of capital, these objectives are
now said to be technologically possible for the first time.
The progress of industrial automation, according to Kelso and Adler, will
inevitably result in a greatly diminished demand for labor of the "subsistence
toil" variety, while capital requirements will grow at an increasing rate. Within
the foreseeable future few households will need or, indeed, be able to rely on
"subsistence toil" for their livelihood. Instead the national product will go to
householders largely in their role as owners of small capital estates. No longer
required to spend most of their time and energies in toil for the sake of subsistence, man's major efforts can be directed toward activities good in themselves-the liberal arts and professions, scholarship, statesmanship, invention,
and the like. In this way man can achieve the perfection of his nature and fulfill
the necessary conditions for maintaining political freedom. This, we are told, is
the realizable utopia which the United States can demonstrate to the world, a
definitive answer to the promises of communism.
This is utopian thinking on a grand scale and perhaps it is unfair to subject
the work of the social philosopher to the dissection usually reserved for a work
of legal scholarship. However, even in its own terms, there are some important
defects in the analysis.
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Perhaps the greatest disappointment is the authors' failure to explore the
relationship between economic and political freedom. In the arsenal of ideasand a "manifesto" must certainly meet rhetorical as well as substantive requirements-a persuasive demonstration that decentralized ownership of property
and some degree of freedom of the market place are conditions of political
liberty would be most useful. Such a demonstration could go far in offsetting a
widely felt distrust of enterprise capitalism as the historical handmaiden of an
outmoded colonialism. However, although this assumption is made, the difficult task of analysis and rhetoric is not undertaken. Mr. Adler's preface talks
of enterprise capitalism as "the economic counterpart of political democracy"
and "the economic substructure needed to support free political institutions"
(p. x), but there the matter is dropped. One is left with nothing more than a
possibly permissible inference that only a populace largely freed from dependence upon subsistence labor can perfect itself sufficiently to sustain free political institutions over a long period. This is a thought which can hardly serve
as a libertarian clarion call to the capital poor areas of the world.
Rather, what the authors have sought to do is demonstrate that controlling
ethical arguments support private ownership of capital. In terms both Aristotelian and, often, Marxian, they argue the injustice of an economic system
which fails to distribute its product to the factors of production in proportion
to the value which each has contributed. Thus they have tried to do explicitly
what some economists, usually amidst vigorous disclaimers, while making "welfare" judgments have done implicitly, i.e., clothe the traditional free market
model with moral vestments. It must certainly be said, however, that the authors' dedication is not to Mr. Herbert Spencer's SocialStatics;their conception
of the role of government is not that of "laissez faire" in a negative sense.
Rather, government is charged with the responsibility for vigorous and affirmative action in the redistribution of large capital holdings and the encouragement
of new capital formation. Still, it can be questioned whether at this moment in
history arguments that ring of natural law add much to the persuasive force of a
document meant to supplant its near namesake as a "call to action."
Although they have made some heroic mistakes in their excursions into economic theory, the authors deserve more praise than blame for this aspect of
their work. It is rather unusual for social philosophers-or lawyers, for that
matter-to bother to try to master even the fundamentals of economic analysis
before making authoritative pronouncements on matters of economic policy.
The authors, on the other hand, present a lucid summary of the role of price in
the direction of resource use and in the allocation of distributive shares. But
unfortunately, at critical points in their discussion, they appear to confuse
average product with productivity at the margin. This largely vitiates their attempt to demonstrate theoretically that today owners of property receive only
a small fraction of what a free market wotuld register as the appropriate return
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to capital. 2 The "proof" from observed facts is equally unpersuasive, for it consists of little more than a list of some of the basic labor-saving inventions before
and since the industrial revolution and some rough data on industrial output
per man-hour of labor during the last century. No economist will regard this as
sufficient proof that the productivity of capital accounts for 90 per cent of the
current national product.
Another aspect of the authors' confusion on this basic economic matter involves the way in which they have defined the factors of production in their model. For thepurposes of the discussion of productivity, labor is defined as the purely
mechanical human contribution. In this sense of the word, it may well be that the
average product of "labor" is, indeed, exceedingly small. But from this one cannot conclude, as the authors do, that labor today is actually receiving a disproportionate share of the national income as distributive shares are measures for
census purposes. The authors surprisingly fail to recognize that a large proportion of the capital of an advanced economy is invested in the technical skills and
general level of education (adaptability) of its workers. Indeed, this capital factor inherent in all human labor, and particularly in a highly skilled and specialized work force, may be large enough to account for most of the difference between the authors' estimates of labor's productivity and those which are more
generally accepted. 3
These analytical deficiencies, however, serious as they are, do not necessarily
destroy the validity of the book's thesis. It is not impossible that automation
will eventually substitute for most "human capital" the work of machines. It is
only that the utopia may be somewhat more distant of possible realization,
even for the most advanced economies, than the authors seem to indicate. It
may be impossible to prove that today the return to capital is lower than it
would be in an economy both less imperfect in the operation of its markets and
as progressive as its members would choose if capital were more equally distributed. But, even if this is so, the authors have another string on their fiddle,
and a more resonant one. This is the desirability for its own sake of a more
equalitarian distribution of ownership of capital. Insofar as there is agreement
on this assumption-and there is apt to be a good deal, probably for reasons
more "felt" than demonstrable 4 -the authors' proposals for reform will require consideration.
2See particularly the discussion at pp. 40-43.
3Compare the highly tentative conclusions regarding the marginal product of labor advanced by Millis and Montgomery after an exhaustive survey of available statistical data. But
it seems clear that even in the (pre-World War I) years before high taxes, strong unionism and
large governmental expenditures, wages and salaries accounted for roughly three-fourths of
value added by manufacture. 1 Millis and Montgomery, The Economics of Labor 171-74
(1938). Thus the authors must bear the burden of showing that in ageneration labor's productive contribution has decreased relatively to that of capital by some two-thirds.
4For example, Professors Blum and Kalven find unpersuasive the many "scientific" arguments advanced in the venerable "interpersonal comparison of utility" controversy that
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Most of the proposals are not particularly novel. But several are breathtaking. To broaden the base of ownership of existing enterprises, the authors
suggest tax encouragement of industrial "equity-sharing" plans (as opposed to
cash profit-sharing); death and gift taxes based on the size of the recipient's
capital holding rather than on the amount of the estate and gifts (no tax to be
levied until the recipient household has achieved a "viable" capital accumulation); and estate and gift tax exemptions for transfers of securities to employees
of closely held corporations, rather than charitable foundations. To encourage
new investment, there is suggested the establishment of a system of investment
preferences under which new investors and owners of small holdings would be
given priority in subscribing to new flotations of "choice" equity securities;
government encouragement of "installment plan" and other types of financing
of investment in substantial blocks of equity securities by holders of sub-viable
estates; and, most unusual of all, government insurance against fluctuations in
the income derived from such holdings, a measure which would constitute the
government's major anticyclical fiscal weapon. Increased dividend income to
shareholders and more effective market direction of capital flow would be
achieved by requiring "mature" corporations to distribute all earnings as dividends, repairing to the capital markets as new funds are required, and by
eventual complete elimination of the corporate income tax. And finally, the
authors suggest overhaul of the income tax structure and other laws, including
labor legislation, to eliminate features which aggravate the concentration of
ownership of capital and may encourage growth of business enterprises beyond
their "optimum" size.
The foregoing summary of the authors' "practical program" is perhaps
sketchy but not much more so than that which it attempts to outline. By
way of apology, the reader is told that the "tentative presentation" of the program was added to the theoretical treatment at a later date, in response to requests for suggestions for action and to stimulate study and discussion.
Several of the proposals are, of course, old reliables which have been fairly
thoroughly discussed in the economic literature. For example, the proposal to
measure gift and estate taxes on a base related to the economic condition of the
recipient was made by Simons in 1938 5-though with the objective of more
accurately measuring income (in conjunction with averaging), rather than in the
present context. The elimination of the corporate income tax and proposals for
forcing out all corporate earnings also have long been standard items for debate
on the public finance agenda. The proposals which are novel, at least to the
greater equality in the distribution of a given national income necessarily produces a higher
"welfare" level. Yet they feel that most people are in some agreement on the objective. Blum
and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1953).
5 Simons, Personal Income Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy (1938).
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writer, are those directed toward stimulating wider ownership of stock through
investment preferences, installment buying of blocks of securities, and dividend
income insurance. But none of these intriguing suggestions-each of which poses
herculean problems in theory and of implementation, to say the least-can be
expected to receive serious critical attention until set out with more precision
and detail. It is to be hoped that Mr. Kelso, to whom Mr. Adler attributes main
credit for the economic analysis and proposals, will find an opportunity to do so,
perhaps in his announced "comprehensive treatise on the theory of capitalism"
of which the present slim volume is presumably in part a preview.
The preview, all in all, is a disappointment in spite of the attractiveness of its
fundamental position and objectives. Unfortunately, its main effect may be to
keep serious students of economic mattes away from the coming attraction.
One hopes not, because amidst its epic failures and recurrent conceptual rigidity
the present work demonstrates some degree of the brilliant audacity of approach and unprofessional originality of ideas which are essential elements of
important utopian writing. If these qualities are in any substantial measure attributable to Mr. Kelso, he is quite an unusual breed of corporation lawyer, and
one from whom we should look forward to hearing again. In its present form,
however, his statement of ideas and proposals would impress most lawyers as
more of a first draft than a polished instrument ready for execution by a client.
Nonetheless, insofar as it calls attention again to some fundamentally important
aspects of the liberal tradition which tend to be overlooked, the work is a much
needed and salutary reminder that perhaps thinking men can still choose a
positive program whose central concern is economic and political freedom.
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Traffic Victims: Tort Law and Insurance. By Leon Green. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1958. Pp. 127. $4.00.
There has been no teacher of torts in the last thirty years who does not owe
a major debt to Leon Green for his energy, scholarship, imagination, and insight. And there are few law students whose education has not been significantly
touched by his work. In brief we are all wiser because of him. The current
volume, a publication of his 1958 Rosenthal lectures at Northwestern University, again places us in his debt. This is a significant book-it is significant because it records permanently and with vigor the final vote of so distinguished
a student of tort law on the merits of that law as applied to the automobile
accident. The vote is a clear and ringing "no." It is announced with the opening
sentence of the book which tells us that the book will "seek to demonstrate the
obsolescence and futility" of the current law and will advocate "comprehensive
compulsory loss insurance as a substitute." It is impressive that after a lifetime

